Introduction
The concept of innateness and its place in biology and other sciences remains controversial. There is dispute about whether it serves any useful function in science and whether the ambiguity of the concept produces problems that outweigh any value it might have. A wide variety of distinct notions have been associated with innateness. A number of people have proposed analyses or explications of the concept in terms of biological ideas such as invariance, generative entrenchment, and canalization (e.g., Sober 1998; Mallon and Weinberg 2006; Wimsatt 1986 Wimsatt , 1999 Ariew 2007 ; see also Griffiths 2009 and references therein). Griffiths et al. (2009) and Linquist et al. (2011) have argued that the folk understanding of innateness at root involves three distinct and empirically dissociable properties-species-typicality, developmentally fixity, and goal-directedness-each of which increases the chances that the folk will judge a trait to be innate. Given the diversity of ideas associated with innateness and the continued confusion that use of the concept has produced, some have proposed that we just stop using the concept. Griffiths (1997 Griffiths ( , 2002 has taken an eliminativist stance, as have some scientists (see Griffiths and Machery 2008, 402 and footnote 1; see also references in Griffiths 2002) .
The eliminativist is right that there are some contexts where the concept of innateness serves no function and could be replaced by a less ambiguous concept and that there are some contexts where scientists using the concept routinely commit fallacies of ambiguity.
1 However, I will show in this paper that in a number of diverse research contexts the concept of innateness does help scientists characterize salient features of trait development. In these contexts, claims about innateness are used mainly to distinguish environmental factors of interest that have a causal influence on the appearance of a trait from those that do not. These contexts include research in immunology, drug resistance, seed dormancy, surgical dexterity, skill and expertise, fears, facial recognition, intelligence, language, morality, universal grammar, and various animal behaviours, such as birdsong. When these scientists label a trait ''innate,'' we can interpret that claim to mean that some set of environmental factors of interest does not have a causal influence on the appearance of the trait: the appearance of the trait is insensitive to these environmental factors. In each context, which factors scientists have in mind when they make innateness claims is usually clear, but across contexts, scientists are interested in different environmental factors, which contributes to the confusion associated with innateness. To reduce this confusion, I propose that we relativize innateness, and I argue that the concept of innateness-properly relativized-still has a productive role to play in science.
Ariew's account of innateness as canalization comes close to characterizing scientists' productive use of innateness in these contexts, because canalization makes a trait insensitive to certain environmental variations. However, as I will argue, canalization is not the only reason that a trait may be insensitive to certain environmental variations, so we should not define innateness in terms of canalization if what really matters in the contexts where innateness is used productively is insensitivity itself, whether produced by canalization or because of some other reason.
So, I offer a new treatment of innateness. I first argue that in a diverse set of contexts where innateness is doing useful work, claims about innateness are best understood as claims about the insensitivity of the appearance of a trait to certain variations in the environment. Second, I argue that innateness claims should be relativized to the range of environmental variations that interest the scientist. My account has two advantages over eliminativism and innateness as canalization. First, it identifies a fruitful research program employing the concept of innateness that appears in a variety of contexts, and, second, it offers a way for scientists using innateness in this fruitful way to carry on employing the concept in their research while minimizing confusion and miscommunication.
I am also advocating a substantial change in how we-including the scientists fruitfully using the concept-talk about innateness. Innateness claims must be relativized. Instead of claiming, for example, that 1. The song of the Brown-headed cowbird is innate, I will suggest that scientists make claims of the type 2. The song of the Brown-headed cowbird is innate with respect to [for instance] exposure to the song of other Brown-headed cowbirds.
(1) is an instance of an unrelativized innateness claim, whereas (2) is relativized. I am arguing that if we are going to retain the concept-which we have reason to do inasmuch as scientists continue to employ it productively-we should understand it strictly in terms of insensitivity, which appears to be the component of the concept that is serving a function in a number of important research contexts, and we should change how we make innateness claims, to restrict the set of inferences that people make on the basis of innateness claims. In the following section, I argue that we should understand innateness claims in terms of insensitivity. I briefly explain how Ariew's account of innateness as canalization does not accurately characterize what scientists are doing when they make fruitful innateness claims. In the next section, I argue that innateness claims should be relativized to the ranges of environmental variations that interest the scientist. In the last section before the conclusion, I discuss how my account allows scientists to continue using the concept of innateness in their research while resisting the confusion usually associated with innateness.
Innateness as the insensitivity of the appearance of a trait to variations in the environment I argue that what scientists are investigating when they study innateness in a number of important contexts is whether certain environmental variations have any effect on the ultimate appearance of a trait of interest-whether the appearance of the trait is insensitive to such variations. By contrast, in a series of important papers, Ariew (1996 Ariew ( , 1999 Ariew ( , 2007 has suggested that canalization is the biological phenomenon that should be taken to underlie innateness.
2 His proposal has attracted a number of critical replies (Mameli and Bateson 2006; Griffiths and Machery 2008; Weinberg and Mallon 2008; Khalidi 2009 ) and some support (Collins 2005) . A developmental pathway is canalized when it is buffered so that it produces a regular outcome (a particular trait) despite certain environmental variations (Waddington 1955). 3 Buffering is a critical feature of canalization: that variations in environmental factors do not produce variations in the trait is a result of mechanisms that operate during development. On Waddington's account, such buffering consists of ''feedback or cybernetic mechanisms'' and is typically the product of natural selection over generations (1953, (124) (125) . Canalization does make the appearance of the trait insensitive to environmental factors, so describing innateness in terms of canalization might seem at first glance to reflect what scientists are doing. If the developmental pathway of a trait is buffered against variations in a particular environmental factor, the product of the developmental pathway will be insensitive to variations in that factor. For instance, over many generations of selection, Drosophila may evolve a complex genetic system that allows them to exhibit a particular wing pattern over a range of temperatures. In earlier generations that lacked the canalized developmental pathway, a change in temperature would affect the developing fly's wing pattern. In the later generations, when a buffering system has evolved, adjusting the temperature within the relevant range will not be associated with any change in the wing pattern of the fly. The canalized developmental pathway produces insensitivity to temperature changes. 4 But a trait that is insensitive to variations in an environmental factor need not be the product of a canalized developmental pathway. The appearance of a trait can be insensitive to variations in an environmental factor simply because variations in the environmental factor have no influence on or interactions with the developmental pathway of the trait whatsoever. For instance, we might investigate whether exposure to some feature of the environment-perhaps a potential pesticide-is associated with any change in wing pattern in a generation of flies. The pesticide might turn out to be something that the flies have no way of detecting or interacting with at any point in development, in which case insensitivity in the appearance of the trait will result-not because the developmental process is buffered against this pesticide but because the pesticide has no causal interactions with the fly's development at all. So, if we find that varying exposure to this pesticide is not associated with any variation in wing pattern, we can conclude that wing pattern is insensitive to variation in exposure to this feature, but we do not have reason to conclude that wing pattern is canalized against exposure to this feature.
When a scientist finds that variations in an environmental factor are associated with variations in the emergence of the trait, this is evidence of sensitivity to that factor and is a reason against claiming that the trait ''is innate'' (specifically, that the trait ''is innate with respect to [the factor that interests the scientist],'' a formulation I defend in the next section). When the scientist finds that varying the environmental factor is not associated with any change in the emergence of the trait, this is evidence that that trait is uninfluenced by-that is, insensitive to-the variation in that factor. This insensitivity, I propose, is the feature that scientists engaged in this type of causal investigation are invoking when they assert that a trait ''is innate'' or ''is likely to be innate.'' For instance, in studies on anti-predator reactions, if ''individuals do not need prior experience with a particular predator to show at least some degree of antipredator (fear or attack) responses at the first encounter,'' the reaction is often categorized as innate (Wiebe 2004, 780) . In this case researchers merely need to demonstrate that the appearance of the minimum anti-predator reaction is insensitive to the presence or absence of prior exposure to the predator. Another example comes from work on ''innate face processing'' (Sugita 2009 ). Sugita found that monkeys deprived of exposure to human and monkey faces for up to 2 years of age nonetheless preferred faces over other objects when finally exposed to them (2009). Here, insensitivity to lack of exposure to faces is enough to support the scientist's characterization of the appearance of the face processing capacity as innate. Numerous similar examples in which a conclusion about innateness is drawn from evidence of insensitivity alone can be found in the literature.
It requires additional work to establish that the insensitivity of the appearance of a trait is the result of canalization. To make the additional claim about canalization, one could look for homeostatic or cybernetic molecular and genetic mechanisms that respond to the environmental perturbation during development. One could also investigate the evolutionary history of the organism to assess whether canalization against that factor might have been selectively advantageous. For instance, Edgell et al. (2009) claim that the differences in plasticity of response to predatory crabs between three snail populations are a product of canalization. They support their claim by appealing to evolutionary evidence: the degree of plasticity is the lowest in the snail population with the longest history of interaction with predatory crabs, and highest in the population with the shortest history of interaction with predatory crabs. They also consider and dismiss an alternative explanation for the plasticity differences, the idea that they might be due to physical constraints. They then advance canalization as the best explanation for the low degree of plasticity in one of the snail populations. Other recent work that goes to similar lengths to support or evaluate canalization claims includes Parkinson et al. (2007), Swiers et al. (2010) , Surkova et al. (2008) , and Ruden et al. (2008) . So, one cannot assume that a trait that is insensitive to certain variations is also canalized with respect to those variations; a claim about canalization requires additional evidence. On Ariew's account, innateness is identified with canalization. Thus, on his account, although insensitivity is sometimes evidence of canalization, scientists cannot legitimately make claims about innateness if the insensitivity they observe is due to reasons other than canalization. Yet many scientists reach conclusions about innateness based on evidence of insensitivity alone rather than evidence of canalization. This makes sense on my account, because it is insensitivity that matters for their purposes. Insensitivity is a feature of the appearance of the trait; canalization is a feature of the developmental pathway that produces the trait. The innateness claims are made as part of an effort to establish that the emergence of the trait is or is not affected by variations in some environmental factor of interest, such as early exposure to faces or prior exposure to predators. Whether the development of the trait is buffered against variations in the environmental factor does not matter for this purpose. Thus, I propose to define innateness simply in terms of insensitivity, without restricting innateness to insensitivity produced in a particular way.
Relativizing innateness to specified environmental variations
The account My thesis is that innateness claims should be relativized to the ranges of environmental variations that interest us. The appearance of a trait is likely to be insensitive to some environmental factors and sensitive to a wide variety of others. As Griffiths and Machery (2008) observe (in terms of independence from the environment), there is no systematic tendency for traits that are on the low end of the sensitivity spectrum of one environmental variable to be on the low end of the sensitivity spectrum of some other variable (2008, 404) .
Griffiths and Machery discuss the case of the Brown-headed Cowbird, in which the male develops a species-typical song even if he does not hear other cowbird males sing it (2008, 403) . Given this evidence, we might be inclined to categorize birdsong in this species as innate. On the other hand, it turns out that the song of the male is heavily influenced by the responses of female cowbirds (2008, 404) . Just based on this evidence, or if this is the only environmental factor that interests us, we might want to classify the cowbird song as not innate.
But of course, numerous potentially interesting factors influence the appearance of any given trait. When we make broad innateness claims without qualifications, we move from evidence of innateness (here understood as insensitivity) with respect to one factor to conclusions about insensitivity with respect to other factors. This move is frequently made without discussion of what reasons there might be to think that the trait's degree of insensitivity to the studied factor would be similar to its degree of insensitivity to any of the other factors introduced when we talk about general innateness. On the account I propose, the cowbird song would be described as ''innate with respect to exposure to the singing of adult cowbird males, and not innate with respect to exposure to female feedback.'' I suggest an account of innateness based on the insensitivity of the appearance of a trait to specified variations in the environment:
A trait T is innate with respect to variations in an environmental factor F within a specified range of F if and only if the appearance of T is insensitive to variations in F within the specified range of F.
The trait of interest should be carefully specified. It might be a morphological structure such as hands, or a morphological structure with some particular feature, such as hands within some size range. It might be a behaviour, such as stimming, or a set of behaviours, such as those that make up autism. The trait might occur at any point in development and might exist only during a particular period: it might be the ability to hear, which develops before birth; particular hormone changes that occur during adolescence; or a late-onset disease, such as Alzheimer's. The relevant trait might appear only in certain segments of the population. For instance, one of the potentially innate traits that interested Konrad Lorenz can be characterized as the display of species-specific courtship behaviour to male mallards by female mallards of reproductive age.
Once the trait of interest has been adequately characterized, the distinction between the appearance of the trait and the developmental trajectory that leads to the trait should be clear. On my account, only influences on the appearance, or coming into existence, of the trait are relevant for determining whether the trait is innate with respect to the specified variations in the environmental factor. If the appearance of the trait is insensitive to the specified variations in the environmental factor, it is innate with respect to those variations. If the appearance of the trait is sensitive to the specified variations in the environmental factor, it is not innate with respect to those variations.
Findings about the sensitivity and insensitivity of the trait to different environmental factors and different ranges of variation in a factor can be combined in a single innateness claim.
Which environmental factors are to be incorporated into the innateness claim should be determined by the interests of the scientist or scientific community. Talk of innateness tends to arise when there is a set of factors hypothesized to have or not have an influence on the development of the trait during the time of interest, especially when there is some dispute about whether a particular environmental factor or type of factor influences trait development. It also arises when an important set of factors have been ruled out as a cause for a trait of interest (e.g. innate fear, innate anxiety). When we want to reduce the prevalence of a trait in a population, such as aggression or antisocial behaviour, we may focus on determining whether the trait is innate with respect to certain environmental factors that we could potentially manipulate, such as childhood exposure to lead, early childhood education, or anger management programs. We may find that antisocial behaviour is unaffected by early childhood education and anger management programs but is reduced by lower childhood exposure to lead. In such a case, we may find it useful to say that antisocial behaviour is innate with respect to early childhood education and anger management programs but it is not innate with respect to lower childhood exposure to lead-and so to prevent this trait we should reduce lead levels. Similarly, we can have conversations about which sorts of desirable psychological traits are innate with regard to which social factors for the purpose of determining which social factors we might manipulate to encourage those traits. For a given trait, there are many environmental factors that we are simply not interested in-some environmental factors would affect the appearance of the trait if they varied, but they never vary; others may obviously have no effect on the appearance of the trait; others may obviously have an effect on the appearance of the trait but we have no control over the factors. In these sorts of cases, it would not be worth knowing that the trait is innate with respect to those factors, and we have no reason to investigate whether the trait is innate with respect to them. This account of innateness permits both very narrow innateness claims, such as that a Drosophila wing pattern is innate with respect to variations in temperature within the range one has tested, and innateness claims of intermediate generality, such as that spatial intelligence is innate with respect to instruction-even though one may not have tested all varieties of instruction before drawing this conclusion. Scientists will want to generalize beyond the factors they have been able to test, to a wider set of factors, and such innateness claims may be supported more or less strongly depending on the experiments that have been done and the reasons we have to expect insensitivity with respect to one factor to generalize to insensitivity with regard to another factor. If several scientists find that the trait is insensitive to various similar factors, they may take this as evidence that the trait is innate with respect to a broader category of factors. If there are traits that are not causally influenced by psychological factors, scientists can talk about those traits as innate with regard to (the very broad category of) psychological factors, and contrast those traits with traits that are not innate with regard to the same set of factors. The only sort of innateness claim my account precludes is the innateness claim that is completely unrelativized.
One may also make useful comparisons between traits on this account. Bird song in one species may be innate with respect to exposure to female feedback, while bird song in a different species is not innate with respect to exposure to female feedback, and bird song in both is innate with respect to exposure to the songs of older males. Such a comparison is far more illuminating than saying that bird song in the first species is more innate or more fixed than bird song in the second species.
One might wonder whether this account makes innateness a matter of degree. It need not. When one is determining whether a trait is innate with respect to variations in some factor, what matters is whether the appearance of the trait is at all sensitive to variations in the factor. The appearance of the trait is either affected or not affected when one varies the environmental factor. In my view, the cases of innateness research that I have discussed are course-grained efforts to rule in or rule out environmental factors as having any sort of causal influence on the appearance of the trait. One could make innateness a matter of degree by considering broader sets of environmental factors. If one combines many environmental factors into one category, such as learning, and one finds that the appearance of the trait is insensitive to many of these factors but sensitive to a few of them, one could say that the trait is mostly innate with regard to learning. However, one could revert to more specific innateness claims, such as the trait is innate with regard to adult instruction and practice but not innate with regard to instruction in childhood, in order to avoid making one's innateness claims a matter of degree and to enable more precise comparisons with other traits.
Application of the account
The debate over the innateness of Universal Grammar illustrates how my account of innateness might apply. Chomsky has postulated the existence of a set of universal grammatical rules that humans possess by a young age but do not learn (Chomsky 1988) . ''Poverty of the stimulus'' arguments support the idea that an individual's possession of the rules of Universal Grammar is not contingent on her linguistic environment, which is too impoverished to account for the grammatical abilities that children exhibit (for discussion of these arguments, see Cowie 1999; Pullum and Scholz 2002) . Children are exposed to only a small set of possible sentences, they may not be alerted to their errors or praised for their acceptable utterances, and they are also exposed to uncorrected mistakes. Many cognitive scientists are interested in whether knowledge of the set of grammatical rules that make up Universal Grammar is innate. The poverty of the stimulus evidence employed to support innateness claims suggests that the factors that interest the scientists making these innateness claims are linguistic factors such as exposure to various grammatical structures, to correction and praise, and to uncorrected mistakes. Thus, I propose that it is implicitly with regard to exposure to these linguistic factors that some cognitive scientists have characterized the rules that constitute Universal Grammar as innate (e.g., Crain 1991). On my account, Universal Grammar could be described as ''innate with respect to exposure to a particular set of uncorrected mistakes'' (for instance), if its appearance is indeed insensitive to exposure to those mistakes.
Here are a few other examples of research contexts in which my account can be applied. First, there is discussion about whether possession of moral rules is innate. Hulsey and Hampson (2014) characterize one view on this subject as saying that moral ''foundations are considered innate insofar as they are organized in advance of experience'' (9). Their claim appears to be that moral foundations are innate with respect to experience, but the researchers must have in mind particular sorts of experienceperhaps they mean that moral foundations are innate with respect to observation of certain social interactions or moral instruction. Second, when some researchers talk about mice with innate anxiety, they might be taken to mean that the mice have anxiety that is not due to some set of factors, potentially including the factor they are testing, such as the inhibiting of a G-protein coupled receptor (Sweeney et al. 2013) . Third, the preference in honeybees for bilaterally symmetric stimuli has been described as innate in the sense that it appears without prior exposure to flowers; I suggest that the preference is innate with respect to prior exposure to flowers (Plowright et al. 2011 ).
An important feature of my account is that it can assimilate a number of other analyses of innateness. These accounts include those on which the concept is understood in terms of the property of being ''unlearned,'' ''not due to experience,'' ''not acquired by cognitive/psychological processes'' (and thus not explicable in psychological terms [Samuels 2004, 139 ; see also Cowie 1999] ), or ''present at birth.'' These interpretations of innateness are part of large subsets of the scientific project I am describing, in which scientists distinguish factors that have an influence on the emergence of the trait from those that do not. Sometimes the factors that interest scientists are learning, experience, cognitive/psychological processes, or any of the factors operating after birth.
5 For instance, my account can be applied in 5 Whether the evidence that scientists supply in any given case is sufficient to show that the trait is actually innate with respect to all experience, or all types of learning is a related problem. When scientists only have the evidence to show that the appearance of the trait does not depend on formal learning, they should either say that the trait is innate with respect to formal learning rather than saying the trait is innate with respect to learning generally or recognize that they have only provided weak evidence for the more general claim.
scientific cases where innateness claims are supported by evidence that the trait is present at birth. Investigating whether humans possess an innate gaze module, a neural mechanism for detecting eye-like stimuli, Batki et al. (2000) found that infants only a few hours old spent more time looking at a photograph of a face with eyes open than a photograph of the same face with eyes shut. They conclude, ''this may reflect the existence of an innate mechanism' ' (2000, 227) . Using my proposed definition, the authors might suggest instead that the gaze module is innate with respect to exposure to environmental factors after birth (or, more accurately in this case, a few hours post-birth), since the emergence of the gaze module, having already come about, would at that point be insensitive to variation in subsequent factors.
In the cases I have discussed, scientists make claims about the innateness of a trait that can be reinterpreted as claims about the sensitivity or insensitivity of the trait to specific types of environmental factors that are of particular interest in that context. These scientists may be viewed as engaged in the useful project of uncovering relevant pieces of the causal networks of development that produce traits of interest to researchers.
Before I conclude this section, I want to indicate an important difference between my account and invariantist accounts of innateness, to which my account might bear a passing resemblance (e.g. Stich 1975; Sober 1998 ; see also discussion in Mallon and Weinberg 2006) . For instance, Sober's account of innateness says that ''a phenotypic trait is innate for a given genotype if and only if that phenotype will emerge in all of a range of developmental environments'' where the range of developmental environments may need to be decided pragmatically (1998, 795) . The account I have proposed breaks from the idea of innateness as a general feature that some traits might have (Stich 1975, 2) , and from the idea that scientists' use of the concept of innateness is part of a project to identify innate traits or to determine whether a given trait is innate. Instead, I have argued that in some important contexts, innateness is serving as a useful tool that helps scientists ascertain whether the appearance of a trait is influenced by particular environmental factors that interest researchers.
Avoiding confusion about innateness
I said at the beginning that my account of innateness offers two advantages. The first, which I discussed in my criticism of Ariew's account of innateness as canalization, is that basing innateness on insensitivity reflects the evidence required to support claims about innateness when scientists use innateness as a tool in the project of investigating whether some set of environmental factors has a causal influence on the appearance of a trait. The second advantage, which I discuss in this section, is that the account prevents various confusions that may follow from claiming that a trait ''is innate'' without relativizing. Griffiths (1997 Griffiths ( , 2002 and others have called attention to the confusion that ensues from the many different properties associated with innateness, such as the properties of being fixed, typical, present at birth, genetic, pancultural, not learned, or not acquired (among others). The public may take the proposal that certain features of personality are innate, for instance, to mean that whether one exhibits a certain personality feature cannot be influenced by any change in the environment, whether training, effort, or improved prenatal nutrition. There is also a worry that the claim that a trait is innate will be taken to mean that people without that trait are abnormal or dysfunctional. Even if I am right that many scientists assessing innateness are actually evaluating insensitivity to particular factors, the type of innateness claims used to express scientific findings-that is, general, unrelativized innateness claims-have the potential to cause confusion and hinder research.
Within each of the individual research traditions I discuss, innateness is used productively because scientists are using an implicitly relativized concept of innateness. The scientists within each research tradition share assumption about which environmental factors matter when talking about the innateness of the trait they study.
One way confusion arises is from the diverse set of environmental factors scientists look at when studying different traits. An ethologist's claim that a variety of birdsong is innate means something very different from an immunologist's claim that an antimicrobial peptide is innate or a medical researcher's claim that the downregulation of an enzyme is innate in rats with hypertension (Boman 1998; Chan et al. 2003) . The ethologist may be interested in birdsong's response to variations in exposure to the behaviour of conspecifics; the immunologist interested in whether an organism's production of the peptide varies depending on previous exposure to the relevant pathogen; and the medical researcher interested in whether the level of the enzyme is affected by the hypertensiveness of the rat. To avoid confusion when communicating their findings to each other or the public, these scientists have to explain what they mean by innateness-they have to explain which environmental factors they are interested in.
Confusion can arise within research traditions when scientists do not share a conception of which environmental factors they are talking about when they make innateness claims. Scientists are sometimes interested in the same trait but test different environmental factors that may influence the trait's appearance. One scientist may conclude that the trait ''is innate'' and the other that it is not, as we saw in the cowbird case. Another puzzling situation is when scientists are investigating the causes of a trait that has already been claimed to be ''innate,'' such as ''innate fear,'' which, though it does not require prior exposure to the source of fear, is nonetheless influenced by other causes worth studying, such as neonatal maternal separation or phase in the estrus cycle (Stevenson et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2009 ). Similarly, cuttlefish have been claimed to have an ''innate preference'' for shrimp because they will choose shrimp over crab at their first feeding, never having eaten either before. This resulted in the claim that ''Early familiarization overrides innate prey preference in newly hatched Sepia officinalis cuttlefish'' when Darmaillacq et al. (2006) found that if cuttlefish were visually exposed to crabs at birth, the cuttlefish would choose crab instead of shrimp at their first feeding (511). A preference for shrimp at first feeding may be innate with respect to some factors, including prior consumption of shrimp and crabs, but it is not innate with respect to visual exposure to crabs at birth.
A worse sort of confusion occurs if claiming that a trait ''is innate'' discourages further research into the causes of the trait in question (for discussion, see Lehrman 1953, 344, 345; Bateson and Mameli 2007, 819; Griffiths and Machery 2008, 405) . Worry about this sort of confusion was one of the reasons that a number of developmental biologists in the middle of the twentieth-century opposed Lorenz's use of the concept (Griffiths 2002, 73; Marler and Slabbekoorn 2004, 26) . Admittedly, Weinberg and Mallon contend that hypothesizing that a trait is innate is likely to spark further study of the trait by those who think the trait is not innate (2008, (421) (422) , but I still think there is some reason for concern here. These confusions or disputes over trait innateness that result from different research motivations or from interests in different potential causes for the trait's appearance would not arise if researchers explicitly made innateness claims specific to the environmental factors that interest them, as my account requires. If innateness claims were relativized in this way, there would be no general innateness property to be contested. 6 Furthermore, relativized innateness claims would be less likely to discourage research on non-obvious causes of the trait in question, if this is in fact a problem. If the factors of interest are specified, research on the causes of traits can be expressed in terms of innateness without suggesting that other causes are uninteresting. As for confusions between scientists and the public, explicitly making innateness claims relative by stating that a trait ''is innate with respect to'' some set of factors would discourage the many connotations associated with the unrelativized phrase ''is innate,'' and would indicate the technical nature and limited significance of the claims.
Some are likely to be pessimistic about the possibility that scientists will be able to override their folk concept of innateness and strip out associated concepts. Linquist et al. (2011) argue that scientists using the concept of innateness will have a hard time using it to mean just one thing, such as fixedness or typicalityscientists will fall back into thinking other things follow from the trait's innateness. However, Knobe and Samuels (2013) have supplied evidence that both the folk and scientists can under some conditions overcome their folk concept of innateness and apply the concept in a more careful way. So the strength of pessimistic worries is not yet overwhelming.
One may also wonder why we should retain the term ''innateness''-perhaps all the studies I have discussed could be conducted under the term ''insensitivity'' and we could avoid the confusing connotations of innateness completely. My view is that scientists would be better off aggressively redefining ''innate'' as a technical term than attempting to eliminate it, and that insensitivity to specified factors is the best candidate for a technical concept of innateness. The interpretations of innateness as being unlearned, not due to certain types of experience, not the product of a cognitive or psychological process, and not due to causal factors postbirth can all be incorporated into the account of innateness I have proposed. By contrast, other concepts associated with innateness, such as general fixity, being essential, or being a part of an animal's nature, are nearly useless for doing biological research or communicating biological ideas to the public, or, as in the case of typicality, canalization, and being the product of evolution or natural selection, are already well characterized, distinct concepts recognized as worth investigating. Furthermore, giving the property of insensitivity with regard to specified factors the innateness label helps us identify work in a variety of contexts as part of the same general research project of delineating environmental factors that influence a trait of interest from those that do not.
Conclusion
I have argued that there is a useful application of the concept of innateness in the context of investigations into the insensitivity of traits to environmental factors of interest. Insensitivity of the appearance of a trait, however, is not tantamount to canalization; canalization is only one source of insensitivity of the appearance of traits. It is the insensitivity of the appearance of traits itself that matters for these scientists' claims about innateness.
Furthermore, I have argued that innateness claims, like claims about canalization, should be made relative to the range of environmental variations that interest the scientists. Making innateness claims relative would improve scientists' ability to accurately communicate the significance of their findings to other scientists and to the general public.
The concept of innateness is serving as a tool across multiple domains, helping scientists demarcate factors that influence the appearance of a trait from those that do not. I have suggested a way for scientists employing the concept as a tool in these contexts to continue their work while minimizing confusion.
